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QUESTION FOR REVIEW 
Does the petitioner set forth any basis whereby cer-
tiorari could be considered? 
The underlying decision of the Utah Supreme Court is 
not ambiguous or confusing. This Court should not reconsider 
its earlier decision in the underlying action. The Court of 
Appeals correctly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
in its ruling. 
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
The Court of Appeals decision in this matter is re-
ported at 758 P.2d 451, 86 UAR 29. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on 
July 8, 1988. A Petition for Rehearing was filed on July 21. 
1988. That petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on 
August 3, 1988. 
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred by Utah Code 
Annotated. §78-2-2(5) (amended 1986). and Rule 42. Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Not applicable 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Trimble. as real estate broker, brought a suit 
against Fitzgerald under the terms of an Earnest Money Agree-
ment and Offer to Purchase whereby Fitzgerald was to buy prop-
erty belonging to Monte Vista Ranch. Inc. The Earnest Money 
Agreement provided that the buyer would be responsible for any 
real estate commissions. The case was tried to a jury and 
then appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which affirmed the 
trial court's decision. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzger-
ald. 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981). 
Trimble then sued Monte Vista Ranch. Inc., for the 
commission claimed to be owing from the same transaction. The 
claim in the second lawsuit was for an alleged oral listing 
agreement wherein Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.. allegedly agreed to 
pay Trimble a commission on the sale of its property. On a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court entered judgment 
dismissing the claim against Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.. on the 
grounds of collteral estoppel. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Trimble v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.. 758 P.2d 451. 86 UAR 29. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Petitioner Does Not Have a Basis for Consid-
eration of Certiorari. 
While it is recognized that Rule 43 of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court is not exclusive, and that the Court 
may entertain any petition for certiorari, the Court has indi-
cated that a petition will only be granted where there are 
special and important reasons for granting a writ of certior-
ari. 
The petitioner in this matter has not set forth any 
claim under Rule 43(1) that there is any conflict between the 
panels of the Court of Appeals, or under Rule 43(2) that the 
Court of Appeals has decided any question of state or federal 
law in conflict with any decision of this Court. He has not 
asserted under Rule 43(3) that the Court of Appeals has ren-
dered a decision departing from the accepted and usual course 
of judicial proceedings. He has not alleged under Rule 43(4) 
that the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state or federal law which has not been settled by 
this Court. 
The petitioner asks this Court to reconsider its own 
former decision and to second guess the interpretation of that 
decision by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision 
from which the Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari has been 
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filed. There are no questions of special or important matters 
for the consideration of this petition. 
POINT II 
The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals Were Not 
Misled by Any Confusing Language in the Utah Supreme 
Court's Prior Opinion. 
The first case of this matter was Mel Trimble Real 
Estate v. Fitzgerald. 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981). That case was 
an action by Mel Trimble Real Estate against the buyer. Fitz-
gerald, for a claimed real estate commission on the sale of 
the Monte Vista Ranch. 
The second case. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte 
Vista Ranch. Inc.. et al.. 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988). was 
an action by Mel Trimble Real Estate against the seller. Monte 
Vista Ranch. Inc.. for the same commission that was denied in 
the first action. 
Petitioner alleges that the parties and the issues 
are different, and that thus there can be no collateral estop-
pel. The distinction between res judicata and collateral 
estoppel is that while the parties in collateral estoppel need 
not be identical, the issues must be the same. As the Court 
of Appeals pointed out on July 8. 1988. collateral estoppel is 
basically issue preclusion. 
In the case against Fitzgerald, one of the principal 
issues was framed in Jury Instruction No. 8. beginning: 
The Court has ruled as a matter of law that 
the agreement of December 7, 1977, imposed 
upon defendant [Fitzgerald] the liability for 
the real estate commission/ if any, owed 
plaintiffs upon this transaction. (emphasis 
added) 
This Court approved that instruction and the ruling 
by the trial judge that any commission which might be owed was 
owed by defendant/buyer. Leland Fitzgerald. The jury found 
that no commission was owed. 
The trial court in the second action, against Monte 
Vista Ranch. Inc., ruled that the issue in that trial was 
essentially the same as the issue in the first trial, i.e.. 
whether a real estate commission was due from the sale of 
Monte Vista Ranch, and if so. who should pay the commission. 
The Court of Appeals found that to be the case when they said: 
It is surely appropriate to conclude the 
trial court would not have ruled that if any 
commission were owed it was owed by Fitzger-
ald, unless that question had been presented 
and litigated. 
(Trimble v. Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.. supra, at page 
454). 
Instruction No. 8 given in the first trial specifi-
cally held, as cited above, that the court had ruled as a 
matter of law that the agreement imposed a duty upon defendant 
Fitzgerald for the liability, if any, for the real estate 
commission. Thus, the conclusion of the appellate court in 
this matter is in perfect harmony with the decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court in the first appeal. 
The first paragraph and the last paragraph of Point I 
of petitioner's brief suggest that because the parties in the 
first case were Trimble against Fitzgerald, and in the second 
case were Trimble against Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., there can 
be no collateral estoppel. Obviously, the appellant does not 
understand the distinctions between the two branches of res 
judicata, and particularly the branch applicable in collateral 
estoppel or issue preclusion.. The conclusions drawn by the 
trial court in granting summary judgment, and the conclusion 
drawn by the Court of Appeals, are in complete harmony with 
the earlier decision of this Court. 
POINT III 
Certiorari Should Not Be Granted So That This 
Court Can Reconsider Its Prior Decision. 
Petitioner claims that the first decision was drafted 
"by a very elderly retired judge" and that the decision was 
"obscure". This writer's experience with Judge Maurice Hard-
ing is that he was at all times alert, very' bright, and very 
perceptive of issues in cases. 
The suggestion that the Supreme Court should now 
reconsider its allegedly ambiguous decision ignores the entire 
principle of res judicata and putting matters to rest. The 
decision was handed down on February 13, 1981; if petitioner 
believed the ruling to be ambiguous, a petition for rehearing 
should have been filed under former Rule 76 of the Utah Rules 
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of Civil Procedure. To suggest that the Court should now 
reconsider its 1981 decision is nothing short of ludicrous. 
This writer does not believe that the 1981 opinion, 
in which Justices Hall. Stewart. Crockett and Henriod all 
concurred, is ambiguous or necessitates any clarification. 
The matter should be brought to rest. 
POINT IV 
The Court of Appeals Did Not Fail to Review 
Its Own Record Before Ruling on the Issue of 
Collateral Estoppel. 
Although petitioner claims Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.. 
was not a party to the earlier action, petitioner conceeds in 
footnote 4 of his petition (page 5) that Monte Vista Ranch. 
Inc.. was a party in the first proceeding in a crossclaira 
brought by Fitzgerald against Monte Vista Ranch. Inc. 
A careful reading of Judge Ormefs decision shows that 
he did consider all of the information in the record submitted 
to him by the appellant. He considered both res judicata and 
collateral estoppel and described the elements necessary (page 
454). and that he specifically discussed whether all of those 
conditions of collateral estoppel were met. He discussed in 
detail the Supreme Court decision, and in footnote 1 (page 
454). he says: 
Trimble's decision not to join Monte Vista or 
its shareholders in the action commenced 
against Fitzgerald tends to suggest Trimble 
knew that, aside from whatever commissions 
other parties might owe, no commission was 
owed by Monte Vista or its shareholders. 
One cannot doubt that the Court of Appeals well un-
derstood that in the trial of the first matter, although Monte 
Vista Ranch. Inc., was not a party, the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel applied because the issue of commission was litigated 
and decided adverse to the plaintiff. 
The Court further discussed at some length the issue 
of judicial notice as to matters outside the record, and con-
cluded that it would not take judicial notice of matters not 
presented to the trial court. The opinion well demonstrates 
the full consideration of this second appeal by the plaintiff, 
and the application and implementation of collateral estoppel 
as a bar to the plaintiff's claim. 
The suggestion that the Court of Appeals failed to 
review its own record is not borne out by the detailed opinion 
rendered in the matter. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should deny the petition for certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of October, 1988. 
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